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The analysis of the vast storehouse of email content accumulated 
or produced by individual users has received relatively little 
attention other than for specific tasks such as spam and virus 
filtering.  Current email analysis in standard client applications 
consists of keyword based matching techniques for filtering and 
expert driven manual exploration of email files.  
We have implemented a tool, called the Email Mining Toolkit 
(EMT) for analyzing email archives which includes a graphical 
display to explore relationships between users and groups of email 
users. The chronological flow of an email message can be 
analyzed by EMT. Our design goal is to embed the technology 
into standard email clients, such as Outlook, revealing far more 
information about a user’s own email history than is otherwise 
now possible. In this paper we detail the visualization techniques 
implemented in EMT. We show the utility of these tools and 
underlying models for detecting email misuse such as viral 
propagation, and spam spread as examples.  
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
H.4.3 [Information Systems Applications]: Communications 




Email, spam, virus. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Email Mining Toolkit (EMT) developed at Columbia 
University [3] is a data mining system that computes behavior 
profiles or models of user email accounts. These models may be 
used for a variety of forensic analyses and detection tasks. The 
toolkit is useful for report generation and summarization of email 
archives, as well as for detecting email security violations when 
incorporated within a real-time violation detection system, such as 
the MET system [1].  
EMT provides the means of loading, parsing and analyzing email 
messages from a wide range of storage formats. It not only 
demonstrates the statistics of email account behavior, it also 
computes the volume and velocity of emails exchanged between 
parties, analyzes specific content and patterns, and explores social 
relationships between groups of users, and the relative rankings of 
importance of different individuals in an organization.  
Moreover, EMT extends these kinds of analyses to model “user 
behavior” at a very fine granularity. It models the behavior of 
individual user email accounts or groups of accounts, and can be 
used to detect changes in behavior that may be of interest in 
forensic analyses. These features of EMT provide the means to 
detect fraudulent misuse and attacks such as viruses and Spam 
(unwanted) email. 
EMT includes 15 different features and models. The statistical 
models that include stationary and non-stationary user profile are 
used to generate user behavior models. These models include  
• Message Table where individual emails may be 
automatically classified by built in machine learning 
subsystems,  
• Usage Histogram revealing a user’s typical daily email 
behavior,  
• Similar Users which identifies groups of emails users 
who behave in similar ways 
• Recipient Frequency providing a detailed analysis of the 
typical communicants with a user and  
• Attachment Statistics detailing attached files serving as 
a personal file system of a user, as well as the statistical 
analyses including the birth rate, lifespan, incident rate, 
prevalence, threat, spread, and death rate useful in 
identifying interesting attachments and viral attachments. 
The analyses built in to EMT concerning groups of accounts and 
their communication is provided to detect violations of group 
behavior. These models include  
• Enclave Clique groups of users who frequently pair 
wise exchange messages,  
• User Clique the set of accounts a particular user 
typically emails as a group,  
• Email Flow revealing how a single message produces a 
web of new communication throughout an organization 
and  
• Average Communication Time that views a user’s 
typical response rates to individuals, indicating the 
relative importance of communicants. 
EMT’s graphical user interface provides an easy to use interface 
to execute these functions and that visualizes results in tabular 
form with displays of plots and histograms that are easy to 
understand.  In this paper, we introduce two important visualized 
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graphical models –the visualization of Cliques and Email Flows. 
A quick inspection of these displays reveals a number of 
interesting pieces of information including how a viral 
propagation appears in a uniform (and quite appealing) flow 
pattern, and the relative importance of an individual user or an 
email message on the basis of how connected they are to other 
users or other emails generated within an organization.  
2. CLIQUES 
In order to study email flows between groups of users, we can 
compute a set of cliques based on the data present in an email 
archive.  We seek to identify clusters or groups of related email 
accounts that participate with each other in common email 
communications. Conceptually, two broad types of cliques can be 
extracted from user email archives: user cliques and enclave 
cliques. In simple terms, user cliques can be inferred by looking at 
the email history of only a single user account, while enclave 
cliques are social groups that emerge as a result of analyzing 
traffic flows among a group of user accounts within an 
organization. 
The graph clique finding algorithm is described in [2]. The 
algorithm initially counts the number of emails exchanged 
between any two given users, regardless of the direction of the 
traffic flow. This absolute number is compared to a threshold. If 
the count is above the threshold, then the link between the two 
underlying accounts is established and a graph begins to form. 
This is computed over all emails and all email accounts appearing 
in all messages, whether sender or receiver of an email. At this 
point, we have a list of cliques of size 2, called dyads. The dyad 
members in each clique are sorted lexicographically, and the 
cliques themselves are sorted in increasing order also. We employ 
the hierarchical algorithm at this point and build lists of cliques of 
size n, with n increasing by 1 with each iteration. Throughout the 
execution of this algorithm, the list of cliques at level n is sorted, 
both among the sets of cliques, and within a set.  The hierarchical 
algorithm is a an iterative procedure with a two-step process – the 
first step is to generate a candidate set and the second step is to 
remove candidates that do not meet the clique definition. When 
the algorithm terminates a completely connected graph is formed 
and ready for display. 
 
2.1 Visualization of Cliques 
In order to be able to run the analysis quickly using low memory 
overhead on typical desktop machines, we resorted to using two 
2-D graphs and simple icons to solve both problems. 
Figure 1, which is called the Clique Panel, displays the cliques 
and their connectivity. Links between nodes indicate that there is 
a common member of both cliques. Each node is itself a clique 
email accounts. The detailed information, such as the members of 
the clique, the sharing users between cliques and the most 
common words appearing in the subject lines, are shown in 
another pop-up window. The nodes are small polygons, and the 
number of edges of these icons represent the number of members 
of the clique. For example, a triangle represents a 3-clique, a 
rectangle represents a 4-clique, and a 2-clique is circle. 
 
Figure 1. Visualization of Clique, the Clique Panel. 
 
The edges in this graph represent the relationship of clique 
members. If there are two cliques with some common member, 
EMT displays a link between the two cliques. We use different 
colors to represent the percentage of users that the two cliques 
share, indicating how similar the cliques are to each other. The 
color mapping is shown in Table 1. For example, cliques A and 
clique B share 30% of users, and hence they are linked with a red 
edge. When the user clicks on an edge, the common users 
appearing in both cliques is displayed. 
 
Table 2. The degree of sharing users 
Color Percentage 
Orange <10% 
Yellow > 10%, <= 20% 
Red > 20%, <= 30% 
Cyan > 30%, <= 40% 
Blue > 40%, <= 50% 
Magenta > 50%, <= 60% 
Green > 60%, <= 70% 
Gray > 70%, <= 80% 
Pink > 80%, <=90% 
Black > 90% 
 
Figure 2, which is called the User Panel, demonstrates the 
relationship between users and their clique membership. The blue 
nodes aligned as the left most column of the display are the 
(indexed) cliques displayed in figure 1. The black nodes are the 
users. Each distinct black node corresponds to one distinct email 
address. They are placed in different columns depending upon the 
number of cliques they belong to. For example, a user who 
belongs to only one clique is in the first column immediately 
adjacent to the blue colored clique nodes. A user who is part of 
two cliques is in the second column, and so forth. The users 
aligned at the right-most column are those who are members of 
the most cliques, and may be regarded as very significant well 
connected individuals in an organization.   
In this panel, an edge connects a user to all of the cliques they 
belong to.  The color of the edges in the graphical display makes 
the graph easier to be read but provides no additional information. 
The alignment reveals the “density” of the user.  
 
 
Figure 2. Visualization of Clique, the User Panel. 
 
To combine these Clique and User Panel, we can visualize a 3-D 
graph. Think about three axes, x, y and z. The Clique Panel is the 
x-z plane and the User Panel is the y-z plane.  Instead of plotting 
a 3-D graph, we use the combination of the two 2-D graphs to 
reveal the same information but at far less cost.  
Because all pairs of cliques may share users (e.g. have edges 
between them), all of the pairs of nodes may have an edge that 
connects them. We need an algorithm that arranges the edges 
without any overlap. Think about a regular polygon. If we draw 
an edge between each pair of nodes, there are no overlapped 
edges. Therefore, the algorithm we implemented firsts draw a big 
circle and then places all of the n clique nodes on this circle 
equally spaced. These nodes form a regular n-polygon. An 
example is displayed in figure 1. All of the nodes are placed 
around the circle and the edges are drawn between nodes within 
this circle. By using this representation, the graph is clear and 
easy to read without any overlapping edges. 
In the User Panel, we also reduce the overlapping edges. 
However, it’s harder to eliminate all possible overlaps. We use 
two simple ways to make the graph clear, even so there are still a 
few overlapping edges. First, each column of user nodes (e.g. the 
black nodes) has a distinct color of edges to connect to the clique 
node (e.g. the blue nodes). Second, the location of the nodes in a 
column is lower than the nodes in the previous column. For 
example, see the black nodes in Figure 2. The location of each 
node of the second column is lower then the corresponding node 
of the first column. 
These two panels visualize the general structure of clique analysis. 
They demonstrate almost all of the information cliques reveal. 
These graphs can be used not only for email cliques, but also for 
Instant Messages (IM) and any kind of messaging, even IP 
connections between host computers in a network. A version of 
EMT is under development for these purposes revealing how 
client computers interact with each other and with servers.  
 
2.2 Anomaly Detection Using Clique 
Violations 
The clique information can be used to identify unusual email 
behavior that violates typical group behavior. Clique violations 
may also indicate email security policy violations internal to a 
secured enclave. For example, members of the legal department of 
a company might be expected to exchange many Word 
attachments containing patent applications. It would be highly 
unusual, and probably unwise, if members of the marketing 
department, and HR services would likewise receive these 
attachments.  
The technique is that we can infer the composition of related 
groups by analyzing normal email flows to compute the naturally 
occurring cliques. These cliques are defined to be the normal 
behavior of an organization. Then we use the learned cliques to 
alert when new email communications between groups  of users 
violate that clique behavior. Clique violation is a useful anomaly 
detection tool. We have performed several experiments 
demonstrating the power of this technique reported in [3]. 
 
 
Figure 3. A Clique Violation Example. 
 
Figure 3 demonstrates a clique violation test. The cliques in this 
experiment are grouped by subject. The blue nodes (#1 to #36) are 
normal cliques that are computed for a set of emails identified as 
the training period. The pink and green nodes (#37 to #63) are 
cliques that are identified as testing data. (EMT allows the user to 
choose any arbitrary set of data to profile and test.) The green 
nodes (#38, #39, #49 and #61) are labeled as normal cliques and 
the pink ones are alerts.  
The detection algorithm is quite simple and is based upon a 
threshold, T, governing the percentage of clique members shared 
between the test and training cliques. If a comparison between the 
test clique and a trained clique is shown to share more than T% of 
their respective members, the test clique is regarded as normal, 
otherwise and alert is generated and the corresponding nodes are 
displayed in the appropriate color identifying likely clique 
violations.  
Since our models use statistical approaches requiring sufficient 
training data to estimate empirical distributions, the system cannot 
easily detect spam messages or propagating viruses that appear 
only once. Sufficient statistics are needed before such email 
events become easily noticed. In any event, when such events do 
occur, they are easy to spot when visualized in the manner 
displayed in Figure 3. 
 
3. EMAIL FLOW 
The email flow analysis in EMT visualizes how an individual 
chosen email message permeates a communication event through 
an organization and shows how people relate to each other via 
these flows. We relate message flows containing the same content 
(via EMT N-Gram analysis described in [4]) as flow networks 
starting from a target email message chosen by the analyst using 
EMT. This kind of analysis may be useful in understanding 
whether or not some email user or their messages have any impact 
on an organization, or are just summarily ignored and have no 
effect. Mangers and industrial engineers may find such a tool 
useful in organizing teams of employees, and identifying those 
who are held in high regard and thus impact the organization and 
its communication flow.  
The flow starts at an individual email message, and follows the 
email flow either by subject, attachment or by similar content 
between messages appearing later in time emanating from 
recipients of the original message. We first gather all of the 
equivalent or similar emails and display these in the window 
details including the relationship of the senders and recipients, 
their content, and the flow over time. 
We can visualize the flow of a message and easily find cliques 
between the email accounts via visually exploring and 
manipulating this graph. Thus, the flow pattern indicated by nodes 
(email accounts) and edges (message exchanges between 
accounts) define interesting “content based cliques” within an 
organization.  
 
3.1 Features of Email Flow and Examples 
In Figure 4, the panel displays the relationship between users. 
Each node is a distinct sender or a recipient. An edge between two 
nodes represents a connection or multiple connections, and the 
different colors represent one-way or two-way connection(s).  
The most important feature in this panel is that it shows a series of 
concentric rings. The inner-most ring and node, corresponds to 
the original target email. Time is depicted by stepping outward 
ring by ring. The nodes in the next closest ring are accounts that 
have exchanged email in the next time step. The spread and 
number of edges and nodes provides a view of how an individual 
message effected communication over a broad set of email 
accounts and the time frame that this spread occurred. 
 
 
Figure 4. A Normal Discussion Via Emails. 
 
 
Figure 5. A Series of Emails Generated by Spambot. 
 
Figure 4 displays a normal email discussion. The emails are 
grouped by subject. We can see that people exchange messages 
with one another. Although these 11 nodes don’t form a full 
clique, we can conclude that they are a strongly related people in a 
group. Figure 5 displays the flow of a spam email. Some email 
account blasted out quite a few copies of the same email to many 
users in rapid succession. Notice the regularity of the plot 
indicating a uniform flow pattern logically produced by an 
automatic procedure, probably a spambot. The name of the sender 
is the same in each message and hence each node is linked to the 
center node, even though the domain names were found to have 
been changed in each message. There are five nodes that send 
emails to one recipient. The plot looks so highly regular it is 
obviously different than normal human communication patterns. 
Figure 6 displays the flow of the propagation of a virus (SoBig.F) 
and is grouped by attachment similarity. Hence, EMT provides a 
means of equating email messages on the basis of similar content, 
similar subject line and similar attachment content. The virus 
creates a random source address of the email, and propagates itself 
relatively quickly. The plot would appear very similar to the spam 
flow plot had we had enough examples in the email archive of the 
viral propagation.  
 
 
Figure 6. An Email Flow of Virus Propagation. 
4. CONCLUSION 
EMT is a data mining system that computes behavior profiles of 
user email accounts. The visualization techniques of clique and 
email flows provide an overview of email exchanges and user 
relationships within an organization. The techniques not only can 
demonstrate email information, but also these can be used to 
detect email misuse and policy violations. These models provide 
the behavior of user account and the behavior of group of users, 
such as the employees in a company or students in an institution. 
EMT is a work in progress. In the future, we will develop other 
analyses germane to different applications and develop methods to 
efficiently combine and visualize the rich variety of models. 
Moreover, we will also try to implement these models for other 
similar internet applications which can be modeled in the same 
way email is modeled. 
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